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1. Introduction
In many sensitive situations, group decisions are required to be unanimous. For instance,
many international organizations could not exist without granting some sort of veto power
to their members. In such cases, the constraint stems from sovereignty and enforceabil-
ity issues (Zamora 1980; Posner and Sykes 2014; and Maggi and Morelli 2006). Other
examples include partnerships and other unlimited liability companies (Romme 2004), or
criminal trials by jury in the US, where a unanimous verdict is required by the constitution.
Unanimous decision making can be seen as a means of ensuring that a reform will
only be adopted if it constitutes a Pareto improvement over the status quo (Wicksell 1967
[1896]; Buchanan and Tullock 1962). However, when information is incomplete, whether
or not a reform is adopted also depends on how information is aggregated (Holmstrom
and Myerson 1983). The literature focuses on the so-called unanimity rule (henceforth
Unanimity), which is commonly used in practice: agents either consent or dissent, and
the reform is only adopted if everyone consents. Unfortunately, this rule features poor
information aggregation properties (Feddersen and Pesendorfer 1998; Austen-Smith and
Banks 2006).
We argue that all unanimous decision rules are not equivalent. We show that k-Veto
rules are (i) Pareto superior to Unanimity, and (ii) ex-ante e¢ cient in a broad class of
situations. Under these rules, agents have three options consent, dissent, or vetoand
the reform is adopted if and only if (i) at least k agents consents, and (ii) there is no veto.
We refer to this rule as Veto when the quorum k corresponds to that of a simple majority.
Let us sketch the argument that underpins our main results using a simple example.
There are three agents who have to vote on whether to adopt a given reform or keep
the status quo. The agents either have private or common value, and this is private
information. Private-value agents always prefer the status quo. Common-value agents
prior is that the reform can be good or bad with equal probabilities, and they equally
dislike a mistake in either direction. Before the vote, each agent receives a private binary
signal regarding the merits of the reform. With probability 23 ; the signal is correct: it is
positive if the reform is good, and negative if the reform is bad. As a result, the right
decision for common-value agents is to adopt the reform if and only if there are at least
two positive signals.
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Under any unanimous rule, it is a weakly dominant strategy for private-value agents
to veto the reform. Therefore, in their presence, the status quo remains, irrespective of
common-value agentsbehavior. This has two implications. First, common-value agents
behave as if there were no private-value agents. Second, unanimous rulesperformances
can only di¤er when all agents have common value. Thus, information aggregation is the
relevant dimension for welfare comparisons.
Under Unanimity, common-value agents with a bad signal are reluctant to veto the
reform because they are pivotal only if the two other agents consent (see Feddersen and
Pesendorfer 1998). In equilibrium, when there are no private-value agents, common-value
agents make the right decision about 88% of the time.
Under Veto, however, it is possible to reveal a negative signal without pinning down
the outcome. This is what happens in an equilibrium: common-value agents with positive
signals consent, and those with negative signals dissent. When there are no private-value
agents, common-value agents always make the right decision.
Therefore, Veto Pareto dominates Unanimity in the sense of Holmstrom and Myerson
(1983) both ex-ante and interim. That is, whatever their type and signals, all agents
(weakly) prefer to use Veto over Unanimity.1
When common-value agents have identical preferences (i.e., homogenous thresholds of
reasonable doubt), this result analytically extends to any precision of (possibly biased)
signals and any group size. But such a stylized structure of preference is not essential.
Indeed, Veto interim Pareto dominates Unanimity in cases where common-value agents
may disagree ex post (i.e., they have heterogeneous thresholds of reasonable doubt).
In our example above, Veto is ex-post e¢ cient. Provided that common-value agents
have homogenous thresholds, this property generalizes as follows: in all cases, there exists
a k-Veto rule that enables common-value agents to always make the right decision. When
they may disagree ex post, the concept of right decisionis ambiguous. Ex-ante e¢ ciency
is then the appropriate benchmark (Holmstrom and Myerson 1983). Relying on a series
of numerical examples and asymptotic results, we show that Veto is ex-ante e¢ cient in a
broad set of situations.
1When there are only common-value agents, k-Veto also Pareto dominates the corresponding k-majority
rule, strictly when negative signals are su¢ ciently precise. This is because k-Veto aggregates information
as well as the best among the corresponding k-majority rule and Unanimity. See discussion in section 5.2.
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To delimit the applicability of our analysis, it is useful to think in terms of social
choice axioms (May 1952). When decisions are required to be unanimous, there is an
inevitable tension between neutrality (alternatives are treated equally) and completeness
(a decision is taken in all cases). We study situations in which a unanimous decision is
required to change a well-dened status quo; thus, we give precedence to completeness
over neutrality. As a result, our analysis is not relevant to cases such as elections, where
neutrality is considered essential (Dasgupta and Maskin 2008).
In real-life situations, the key elements that make our analysis relevant are: (i) a
common-value dimension; (ii) a unanimity requirement; (iii) limits to timely and truthful
pre-vote communication. In Section 6, we argue that international organizations are a case
in point. We discuss the case of the United Nations Security Council, which illustrates
well the reasons for the use of k-Veto rules in the real world and why they have replaced
Unanimity in some cases.
From a normative point of view, our results suggest that a number of voting bodies that
use Unanimity should consider using a k-Veto rule instead. Examples include international
organizations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Council of the European
Union in the case of most sensitive topics (a k-Veto rule is already in use for matters of
Common Foreign and Security Policy), and the Southern Common Market (Mercosur).
Furthermore, their Pareto dominance, and their relative simplicity, hint that such an
institutional reform may not encounter too much resistance.
Finally, there is a vast literature that views trials by jury as an information aggregation
problem where the voting system plays a crucial role. Our analysis applies to such trials
if, following this literature, we treat a hung jury as an absence of conviction. One of the
main debates focuses on whether to use Unanimity or some form of majority rule. Because
Veto combine the strengths of both Unanimity and majority rule, our results may bring
the two sides of the debate closer together.
Related Literature. A key idea of this paper is that, compared to Unanimity, Veto
enriches the strategic environment so that veto power can be granted without sacricing
information aggregation. This contrasts with an earlier literature that suggests that these
two dimensions are in conict. Specically, the information aggregation literature shows
that the implementation of simple voting rules designed to protect minority rights may lead
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to poor information aggregation and, somewhat paradoxically, may accomplish neither of
the two goals (Feddersen and Pesendorfer 1998).
Later studies have, however, identied cases where these goals are not incompatible.
First, Coughlan (2001) shows that Unanimity aggregates information well in two variations
of Feddersen and Pesendorfers model. In the rst, the unanimity requirement is two-
sided, but costless mistrials are allowed. Full information aggregation is feasible, but
it may require agents to vote again and again on the same reform proposal until it is
accepted or rejected unanimously. In the second, he considers pre-vote communication.
Full information aggregation requires that agents have very similar preferences. In a
related paper, Austen-Smith and Feddersen (2006) show that, in setups where preferences
are uncertain, truthful revelation of private information is particularly problematic when
agents have veto power. Second, Maug and Yilmaz (2002) show that, when preferences
are common knowledge, requiring a majority within all (adequately designed) subgroups
of an electorate can achieve information aggregation while protecting minority rights.
Broadly speaking, our paper relates to three strands of the literature. First, it relates to
the literature analyzing supermajority rules and/or veto power (e.g., Chen and Ordeshook
1998; Guttman 1998; Sobel and Holcombe 1999; Groseclose and McCarty 2001; Tsebelis
2002; Aghion and Bolton 2003; McGann 2004; Dougherty and Edward 2005; Maggi and
Morelli 2006; Dziuda and Loeper 2015; Nunnari 2016). Second, it is connected to the
literature that studies information aggregation in two-alternative decisions with strategic
voters (see, e.g., Austen-Smith and Banks 1996; Feddersen and Pesendorfer 1996, 1997,
1998; Myerson 1998; McLennan 1998; Chwe 1999; Guarnaschelli et al. 2000; Coughlan
2001; Austen-Smith and Feddersen 2006; Maug and Yilmaz 2006; Martinelli, 2006; Gerardi
and Yariv, 2007; Van Weelden 2008; Battaglini et al. 2008, 2010; Bond and Eraslan 2009;
Goeree and Yariv 2010; Bhattacharya 2012; Mandler 2012; McMurray 2013). Third, it
is related to the literature studying properties of voting systems (see, e.g., Myerson and
Weber 1993; Myerson 2000, 2002; Piketty 2000; Dewan and Myatt 2007; Myatt 2007,
2015; Ahn and Oliveros 2012, 2014; Bouton and Castanheira 2012; Bouton 2013; Ekmekci
and Lauermann 2015; Herrera et al. 2015; Bouton et al. 2016).
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2. The Model
A group of n  3 agents (with n odd) must choose between two alternatives, the status
quo Q and the reform R.2
Information structure. There are two states of nature, ! 2 f!Q; !Rg, which materialize
with equal probability. The actual state of nature is not observable, but each agent
privately observes an imperfectly informative signal. Conditional on the state of nature,
the signals are independently drawn. There are two possible signals: sQ and sR. The
probability of an agent observing signal sQ is higher in state !Q than in state !R; and the
converse is true for sR:
Pr(sRj!R) > Pr(sRj!Q) > 0 and Pr(sQj!Q) > Pr(sQj!R) > 0:
This assumption is made without loss of generality. In particular, it allows for cases in
which observing one signal is more likely than the other in both states e.g., Pr(sQj!R) >
Pr(sRj!R). In a slight abuse of notation, we denote by si the signal received by agent i:
Preferences. Agents may have common value or private value. Common-value agents all
prefer decision Q in state !Q and decision R in state !R. However, common-value agents
may di¤er in their disutility from wrong decisions. We capture this with the following von
Neumann-Morgenstern utility function:
State of the world
!R !Q
Group R 0  ci
Decision Q   (1  ci) 0
where ci 2 (0; 1). In this representation, ci and (1   ci) are the respective weight that
common-value agent i attaches to errors of type I (adopting a bad reform) and type
II (not adopting a good reform). Therefore, ci can be interpreted as a measure of her
cautiousness or, in a jury context, her threshold of reasonable doubt. In the baseline
model (Sections 3 and 4), we focus on the case with homogenous cautiousness, where ci is
the same for all common-value agents. In an extension (Section 5.1) we study the more
2That n is odd only simplies the exposition.
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general heterogeneous cautiousness cases, where ci 2 (0; 1) may vary across common-value
agents. Private-value agents prefer the status quo Q, irrespective of the state of nature.
Each agent faces an ex-ante probability pi 2 [0; 1) of being a private-value agent, and a
probability 1   pi of being a common-value one. We denote the corresponding vector by
p  (p1; p2; :::; pn).
Types. We denote the (realized) type of agent i by i, where i = P for private-value
agents and i = (si; ci) for common-value agents. Thus, the set of possible types is
  P [ fsQ; sRg  (0; 1): We denote by   (1; 2; :::; n) 2 n the vector of realized
type proles in the group.
Mechanisms (or decision rules). We denote by M a mechanism that maps a type
prole  into a group decision (this can be a probabilistic mapping):
M : n!4 (fQ;Rg) :
Voting systems. A voting system 	 is a set of possible actions A	 and an aggrega-
tion rule d	 mapping agentsactions into a group decision: d	 :

a 2 A		n ! fQ;Rg.
The mapping implied by a voting system and an associated equilibrium strategy prole
constitutes a mechanism.
The following voting systems are central to our analysis.
Denition 1 Denition 1. For each k = 1; 2; :::; n 1, voting system k-Vetois dened
by: V k  Ak; dk	, where:
Ak = fr; q; vg
dk =
8<: R if Xv = 0 and Xr  kQ otherwise,
where Xa denotes the total number of agents playing action a.
Since a single v su¢ ces to enforce the status quo Q, it can be interpreted as a veto
exercised against the reform R. Accordingly, r and q can be interpreted as votes for and
against the reform. The aggregation rule stipulates that the reform is implemented if, and
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only if, there is no veto and there are at least k votes in favor of R. As such, k can be
interpreted as an approval quorum.
Denition 2 Denition 2. Voting system Unanimity is dened by: U  AU ; dU	,
where:
AU = fr; vg
dU =
8<: R if Xv = 0 and Xr = nQ otherwise,
Our denition of Unanimity corresponds to the standard in the literature (see, e.g.,
Feddersen and Pesendorfer 1998, Duggan and Martinelli 2001, Austen-Smith and Fedder-
sen 2006).
Remark 1 Remark 1. Unanimity is strategically equivalent to a rule often called Con-
sensus. Under Consensus, the reform is adopted if no agent opposes it. Formally, Con-
sensus can be dened by action set fq; vg, and the same decision rule as under Unanimity.
Here, q denotes silent consent.
Strategy and equilibrium concept. Following the literature (e.g., Feddersen and
Pesendorfer 1998), we focus on responsive symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibria. An agents
strategy is thus a function  :  ! 4  A	. In particular, a() denotes the probability
with which an agent of type  votes a. A responsive prole is such that (i) at least
some types play action r with positive probability, and (ii) not all of them play r with
probability 1. This ensures that, in equilibrium, some pivot probabilities are strictly
positive i.e., agents a¤ect the outcome of the vote with positive probability. Given that
the reform R is implemented with positive probability for any responsive strategy prole,
private-value agents always strictly prefer to vote against R. Thus, they always use their




In this section, we present the main equilibrium results and provide intuition that will be
useful to understand the welfare results.
Any equilibrium under k-Veto satises two conditions:
Proposition 1 Proposition 1. For any p;  is an equilibrium under k-Veto if and
only if:
i) private-value agents veto the reform, and
ii)  is an equilibrium of the corresponding game with p = 0:
Proof. First, recall that v is a strictly dominant strategy for P -agents. Therefore, any equilib-
rium under k-Veto satises point (i) in the proposition. Second, given (i), if 9i s.t. i = P , then
the group decision is Q irrespective of what any other agent does. Thus, common-value agents
condition their behavior on i 6= P 8i: Therefore, we have that (1) the strategy prole played
by common-value agents in any equilibrium under k-Veto must form an equilibrium when p = 0:
(2) if  is an equilibrium strategy prole of the game when p = 0, it must also be an optimal
strategy prole for common-value agents 8p 6= 0.
Based on this result, we focus on the pure common-value game (p = 0) to describe
the behavior of common-value agents.
For the remainder of this section, we assume that ci is identical for all common-value
agents. For simplicity, we set ci = 12 .
3 At this point it is useful to introduce new pieces
of notation. First, we denote the (relative) precision, or likelihood ratio, of signal sQ by
Q 
Pr(sQj!Q)
Pr(sQj!R) 2 (1;1) and that of signal sR by R 
Pr(sRj!R)
Pr(sRj!Q) 2 (1;1). Second, with
a slight abuse of notation, we denote by R (Q) the type of a common-value agent who
receives signal sR (sQ).
The following Lemma extends Austen-Smith and Banks(1996) result on informative
voting under k-majority rules to our k-Veto system.




; there is a k such that k-Veto admits
an equilibrium in which: (i) R-agents play r; (ii) Q-agents play q if Q < (R)
n 1, and
v otherwise.
3Given that we consider all possible signal precision, this assumption is without loss of generality.
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Proof. See Appendix A3.
We now describe equilibrium behavior in greater detail for Veto.
Lemma 2 Lemma 2. Under Veto, the pure common-value game admits at most two
equilibria.
Proof. The full characterization of the set of equilibria and the proofs are in Appendix A1.
We now discuss these equilibria in turn.
The Information-Aggregation Equilibrium. In the rst and most interesting equi-
librium, agent behavior is easily understood through a series of simple examples.
First, assume that signal precision is symmetric. That is, R = Q. In this case,
R-agents simply play r and Q-agents play q. This is because both signals have the same
information content and the aggregation rule gives the same weight to r and q votes.
If signal precision is su¢ ciently asymmetric, agents compensatei.e., agents with
the less informative signal mix between r and q. As long as Q is not too high (compared
to R), agents do not use their veto power and their equilibrium behavior is exactly the
same as what it would be under simple majority rule. However, when Q exceeds a certain
threshold, agents with an sQ signal start vetoing with positive probability.
Finally, if Q  (R)n 1, the equilibrium under Veto is unique (and it is the same
as the unique equilibrium under Unanimity). In that case, the signal sQ is so precise
that it becomes a weakly dominant strategy for Q-agents to veto (in fact, conditional on
observing all the signals, a single negative signal su¢ ces to convince an agent that the
reform is bad). The best response for R-agents is to vote r, and the reform is implemented
if and only if there is no Q-agent.
Remark 2 Remark 2. In the information-aggregation equilibrium of the general game,
agent behavior can be interpreted as a combination of what the agent would do under
Unanimity and majority rule (without veto power). Veto indeed allows agents to reproduce
any strategy played under majority rule or Unanimity. In particular, they use the veto
power to protect their private interest (which they cannot do under majority rule), and
they vote against the reform (without vetoing it) when they have a negative, but non-
conclusive, signal about it (which they cannot do under Unanimity).
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The Unanimity-Like Equilibrium. When Q < (R)
n 1 ; Veto admits a second equi-
librium. This equilibrium corresponds to the unique equilibrium under Unanimity, as
characterized in Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998): R-agents vote r, and Q-agents ran-
domize between r and v.
We see the Unanimity-like equilibrium as a less credible predictor of agent behavior
than the information aggregation equilibrium (see the discussion in Appendix A1 and
Bouton, Llorente-Saguer, Malherbe 2016). If agents play the former, outcomes are simply
equivalent under Veto and Unanimity, and the two systems feature identical welfare prop-
erties. This is why the welfare analysis focuses on the information aggregation equilibrium.
4. Welfare Analysis
In this section, we study the welfare properties of k-Veto based on the equilibrium analysis
above (that is, when common-value agents have homogenous cautiousness: ci = 12). We
rst establish that Veto interim dominates Unanimity. We then show that (i) Veto is
ex-ante e¢ cient when agents play pure strategies at equilibrium; (ii) there always exists a
k-Veto system that is e¢ cient; and (iii) Veto is asymptotically optimal.
4.1. E¢ ciency Concepts
Utility. For a given mechanism M and a given prole , we can dene e1(M;) and
e2(M;), the probability that decision R is taken in state !Q, and the probability that
decision Q is taken in state !R, respectively. Therefore, they correspond to (ex-post)
expected probabilities of errors of type I and II (from a common-value agents perspective).
We have:
e1(M;)  Pr (!Qj) Pr (M () = R)
e2(M;)  Pr (!Rj) Pr (M () = Q)
We are now in position to dene the ex-post, interim, and ex-ante utility of an agent
i, under any mechanism M :
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ui(M j)   cie1(M;)  (1  ci)e2(M;);
ui(M ji)  E [ui(M j)ji]
ui(M)  E [ui(M j)]
Dominance and E¢ ciency. We focus on Pareto dominance and e¢ ciency as for-
malized by Holmstrom and Myerson (1983).
Denition 3 Denition 3. MechanismM interim dominates mechanismM 0 if ui(M ji) 
ui(M
0ji), 8i; i. And M interim strictly dominates M 0 if this condition also holds with
strict inequality for some i and i.
Ex-ante and ex-post dominance are dened similarly and the denitions of e¢ ciency
directly follow.
Denition 4 Denition 4. Mechanism M is ex-ante (interim, ex-post) e¢ cient if it is
not ex-ante (interim, ex-post) strictly dominated by another mechanism.
Note that interim dominance implies ex-ante dominance, and that ex-ante e¢ ciency
implies interim e¢ ciency.
Comparing Voting Systems. A voting system 	 and an associated strategy prole




For what follows, let us adapt the denition of interim dominance and take into account
potential equilibrium multiplicity.
Denition 5 Denition 5. Voting system 	 Interim dominates voting system 	0 if
there exists an equilibrium  under 	 such that ui(	ji)  ui(	00 ji) for all equilibria 0
under 	0, for all i; and all i: And 	 interim strictly dominates 	0 if this condition also
holds with strict inequality in each 0, for some i; and some i:
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4.2. Veto Interim Dominates Unanimity




, Veto interim (and thus ex-ante)
dominates Unanimity; strictly unless Q  (R)n 1.
Proof. See Appendix A3.
Theorem 1 is a powerful result: it implies that no agent (even after learning their type)
would object to getting rid of Unanimity and using Veto instead.
The intuition is as follows. First, when there is at least one private-value agent in the
group, the status quo is kept under the two systems. Let us focus on the cases where there
are only common-value agents and consider Q- and R-agents in turn. Under Unanimity,
Q-agents play v with positive probability. Thus, their interim utility equals the utility
of getting Q with probability 1. Since they can also play v under Veto (and get Q with
probability 1), they cannot be worse o¤. By a simple revealed preference argument, they
are strictly better o¤ in the cases where they strictly prefer to vote q (which is typical of
the information aggregation equilibrium).
For R-agents, the intuition goes as follows: under Unanimity the reform R is rarely
chosen. This implies that the probability of making a mistake is relatively high in state
!R: Given that R-agents believe that state !R is more likely than state !Q; their interim
utility under Unanimity is low. Since Veto does not su¤er from the same weakness, R-
agents are strictly better o¤ under Veto than under Unanimity.
One can also establish that the interim dominance of k-Veto over Unanimity implies the
interim dominance of k0-Veto over Unanimity for k < k0  n: To see the intuition behind
this, pick an arbitrary vector of values for Q, R; n; and p and denote k
 the quorum
such that k-Veto is e¢ cient (see Theorem 2 below). If k0 > k, the quorum is too high to
aggregate information perfectly. However, under Unanimity, the corresponding quorum
would be n, and information aggregation would be even worse. Now, consider k0 < k.
In this case, the quorum is too low. But we know that Veto dominates when k = n+12 :
Therefore, increasing the quorum (that is, bringing it closer to k) can only improve
information aggregation. One cannot conclude, however, that the strict dominance result
applies for all parameter values for all quorums strictly below n+12 :
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4.3. Is Veto E¢ cient?
We have established that Veto dominates Unanimity, but are there mechanisms that dom-
inate Veto?
Given our research question, we restrict our attention to unanimous mechanism i.e.,
mechanisms that allow any agent to enforce the status quo. In a voting set-up, this means
that agents must have veto power. In a more general mechanism design approach, we
capture this restriction by imposing that, under an admissible mechanism, the interim
utility of all agents is at least as high as their utility under the status-quo.
This constraint (which we will refer to as the veto constraint) can be understood as
an interim participation constraint, where agentsoutside option is their utility under the
status quo. The veto constraint can equally be interpreted as resulting from an ex-ante
participation constraint in a version of the model in which some agents in some states
would have a su¢ ciently large disutility from the reform. In this case, agents are only
willing to participate ex ante if the mechanism ensures that they will be able to block any
reform that would critically hurt their interest.4
Denition 6 Denition 6. A mechanism is admissible if it satises:
ui(M ji)  ui(MQji);8i;
where MQ is a trivial mechanism that keeps the status quo for all type prole: MQ() = Q;
8: We denote byM the set of such admissible mechanisms.
Since private-value agents dislike the reform irrespective of the state of nature, all
admissible mechanisms must keep the status quo for any type prole including a private-
value agent. This implies that a mechanisms relative performance (and its e¢ ciency)
can be assessed on the basis of its outcome for type proles including only common-value
agents.
Henceforth, we will only compare admissible mechanisms. For instance, when we
state that a mechanism is e¢ cient, this must be understood as e¢ cient within the set
of admissible mechanisms. When relevant, we also impose incentive compatibility (see
4Such interpretation directly speaks to applications such as partnerships, or to sovereignty issues in
the case of international organisations.
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Section 5.1). Given that k-Veto and Unanimity give veto power to each agent in the group
(and that incentive compatibility constraints are, by denition, satised in equilibrium),
both voting systems at equilibrium are admissible mechanisms.
Lemma 3 Lemma 3. The following mechanism is ex-ante e¢ cient:
M () 
8><>:
R if 8i; i 6= P and Pr (!Rj)  ci;
Q otherwise.
Proof. First, note that M () is admissible. Second, since there is no ex-post disagreement
among common-value agents, it is ex-post e¢ cient. Third, there is no admissible mechanism that
gives higher ex-post utility to any agent. Thus, it is incentive compatible and ex-ante e¢ cient.
Denition 7 Denition 7. Voting system 	 is e¢ cient if there exists an equilibrium 
under 	 such that 	 () =M (), for all .





or Q  (R)n 1 :
Proof. The only non-trivial case is when the type prole does not include private-value agents
i.e., i 6= P ;8i. Consider the information-aggregation equilibrium characterized in Proposi-




n 1 ], R-agents play r, and Q-agents play





n 1 ], Pr(!Rj) > 12 if and only if there are more R-agents than Q-agents.
If Q  (R)n 1, R-agents play r; and Q-agents play v; R is thus implemented only if there is
no Q-agents. But given that Q  (R)n 1, Pr(!Rj) > 12 if and only if there are no Q-agents.
Therefore, Veto at the information-aggregation equilibrium matches M () ;8.
For a voting system to be e¢ cient, it is necessary that agents use pure strategies
(otherwise one cannot have full information revelation). However, we know from Lemma 1
that adjusting the approval quorum k can induce agents to do so. This leads to the
following theorem.5
5This result is related to Theorem 1 in Costinot and Kartik (2007). They show that, in the standard
framework of the Condorcet jury literature with binary states and binary signals, there is a majority rule
that is ex-ante e¢ cient. In our setup, however, majority rules are not admissible (except when p = 0).
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, there exists a k-Veto voting
system that is ex-ante e¢ cient.
Proof. If Q  (R)n 1 ; all k-Veto rules are e¢ cient. If Q < (R)n 1 ; we know from Lemma 1




; there is a k such that the rule admits an equi-
librium in which R-agents play r and Q-agents play q. This directly implies that, for such a
k, k-Veto implements R if and only if there are no private-value agents and the number of sR is
greater than or equal to k. Given Lemma 3, it remains to be proven that Pr (!Rj)  12 if and
only if the number of sR signals is greater than or equal to k. But for R-agents to play r and
Q-agents to play q in equilibrium, it must be the case that (i) for any  such that the number of
sR received equals k; Pr (!Rj)  12 , and (ii) for any  such that the number of sR signals received
is equal to k   1; 12 > Pr (!Rj).
In practice, it would be useful to have a system that performs well for di¤erent sets
of parameters. This is, for instance,the case for a decision body that presides over many
di¤erent issues but cannot adapt its voting system to the question at hand. Unfortunately,
there is no k-Veto voting system that is ex-ante e¢ cient for all values of the parameters.
However, as implied above, Vetos departure from e¢ ciency stems from the use of mixed
strategies. Therefore, increasing the groups size reduces ine¢ ciency. As we show in the
next section, it vanishes as n increases.
4.3.1 Asymptotic Results
In this subsection, we establish Vetos appealing asymptotic properties.
Denition 8 Denition 8. Mechanism M is asymptotically optimal if, with a proba-
bility that tends to 1 when n tends to 1; it selects:
R if ! = !R and i 6= P 8i;
Q otherwise.
The decision is optimal if, given the state of nature and the type prole, the reform is
adopted if and only if it constitutes a Pareto improvement over the status quo.6
6For Veto and Unanimity, this denition of asymptotic optimality corresponds to the full information
equivalence benchmark used in the Condorcet Jury Theorem literature.
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Let plim denote the limit probability of having at least one private-value agent in the
group:7
plim  1  lim
n!1
n
i=1 (1  pi) :
When plim = 1, the optimal decision is always to keep the status quo. In that case, all
admissible mechanisms are asymptotically optimal. When plim < 1, information aggrega-
tion remains relevant in the limit. It turns out that Veto is asymptotically optimal in this
case as well.
Proposition 3 Proposition 3. For all Q, R; and p, Veto is asymptotically optimal.
Proof. First, given that v (P ) = 1; we have that 8 such that i = P for some i; Veto keeps
the status quo Q; which is optimal. Second, it is easy to see that in the information-aggregation
equilibrium of Section 3, for any R and Q; in the limit, v () = 0 8 2 fR; Qg. Therefore,
if i 6= P 8i; the outcome under Veto is exactly the same as under simple majority rule when
p = 0: We know from Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998) that, when p = 0; simple majority rule
aggregates information perfectly in the limit i.e., the group chooses R in state !R and Q in state
!Q with a probability that tends to 1 when n!1:8
In the case where plim < 1, Unanimity is not asymptotically optimal when it is interim
strictly dominated by Veto.
5. Discussion and Extensions
In this section, we rst extend our analysis to a version of the model that allows for
disagreement among common-value agents. Then we explore the consequences of relaxing
the veto constraint.
5.1. Preference Diversity
To introduce disagreement among common-value agents, we allow ci to di¤er across them.
However, to avoid unnecessary complications, we assume that the probability of receiving
the correct signal is the same in both states; i.e., Pr(sQj!Q) = Pr (sRj!R) =  > 12 :
7The limit exists, since ni=1 (1  pi) monotonically decreases with n and is bounded below by zero.
8Although our setup is slightly di¤erent than that of Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998), the proof is
almost identical.
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We adopt a two-fold strategy to overcome the technical challenges heterogeneous cis
implies. First, we focus on a case with three agents and two levels of cautiousness. In this
case, the model is still analytically tractable: we are able to fully characterize equilibria
and, for some values of the parameters establish the welfare results analytically. We use
numerical methods otherwise.
Second, we study the asymptotic properties of Veto. This is the standard approach for
analyzing models with rich preference structure, signal space, and/or state space. We show
that Veto is still asymptotically optimal (and thus interim strictly dominates Unanimity
when n is su¢ ciently large).
5.1.1. Three Agents
There are three common-value agents that may di¤er in their level of cautiousness.9 Agents
can be neutral, in which case they have the same cautiousness parameter as before (cN =
1
2), or cautious, with cH 2 (12 ; 1). That is, cautious agents dislike errors of type I (adopting
a bad reform) relatively more than errors of type II (not adopting a good reform). Ex
ante, agents face an identical probability  2 [0; 1) of being cautious.
Example. To provide intuition on agent behavior and why Veto still dominates Unanim-
ity, we rst focus on parameter values for which there is a pure strategy equilibrium under
Veto. Suppose that (i)  is not too high (see below for details), and (ii) cautious agents,
if they could observe all signals, prefer the reform only if there are three signals sR (by
construction, neutral agents prefer the reform if there are at least two signals sR).
Under Veto, there is an equilibrium such that: cautious agents vote q if they receive a
signal sR, and they veto if they receive a signal sQ; neutral agents vote r if they receive
a signal sR, and they vote q if they receive a signal sQ. Under Unanimity, if cH is high
enough, cautious agents veto irrespective of their signal. Neutral agents vote r if they
receive a signal sR, and they mix between r and v with a signal sQ.
Why does Veto interim dominate Unanimity? First, if there are only neutral agents,
Veto aggregates information perfectly (which leads to the right decision from their common
viewpoint), but Unanimity does not. Second, if there is at least one cautious agent:
(i) under Unanimity, the status quo always remains; (ii) under Veto, the status quo remains
9We do not include private-value agents because this would not a¤ect the results.
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in the case where all agents receive an sR signal and at most one of them is cautious. But
when that is the case, R is the only ex-post e¢ cient, and therefore right,decision. Thus,
Veto strictly interim dominates Unanimity.
Generalization. We can characterize an equilibrium for all values of the parameters un-







and   12 : Based on this characterization, we are able to analytically prove that Veto
interim dominates Unanimity for two other sets of parameter values: if cH   or
cH  33+(1 )3 . In both cases, the intuition from the baseline model is useful: when
cH  , cautious agents are essentially neutral agents because there is no ex-post dis-
agreement; when cH  33+(1 )3 ; it is a weakly dominant strategy for cautious agents to
veto the reform irrespective of their signal. Thus, they behave like private-value agents.
The interim dominance result of Theorem 1 therefore readily extends.
For other parameter values, tractability is an issue. We use the following numerical ap-





,  2 (0; 1) and  2  12 ; 1 in steps of 0:001.
Second, for each parameter combination, we compute interim utility (up to a precision of
1E   10) for each type of agent under both systems based on our analytical characteriza-
tion of equilibrium. Veto both interim and ex-ante strictly dominates Unanimity for all
parameter combinations in the grid.
E¢ ciency. When common-value agents may disagree ex-post, incentive compatibility
constraints must be taken into account. For each point of the parameter grid, we consider
all pure mechanisms -that is, all possible mappings from type proles into pure decisions
(M : n ! fR;Qg). For each of these mechanisms, we compute interim utility ui(M ji)
under truthful revelation and discard those that are not admissible or incentive compatible.
Our e¢ ciency benchmark MIC is the mechanism that maximizes ex-ante utility among
the remaining candidates.
Three major patterns emerge (see the Online Appendix for more details). First, Veto
matches MIC when cH takes either low or high values. In contrast, Unanimity is always
ex-ante strictly dominated by MIC . Second, for intermediate values of cH , Veto does
not match MIC , but it generates fairly close levels of ex-ante utility. For a certain range
of parameters, Veto even strictly ex-ante dominates MIC .
10 Finally, when Veto is ex-
10This is possible when the equilibrium is in mixed strategies.
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ante strictly dominated by MIC , Unanimity is dominated by M

IC by a margin that is
typically an order of magnitude larger (when both  and cH are large, however, this
margin decreases).
5.1.2. Large Groups
To explore the asymptotic properties of Veto (and Unanimity) and allow for private-value
agents, we adapt the setup of Gerardi (2000). With probability pi 2 [0; 1); agent is is a
private-value agent (i = P ): With probability 1   pi, agent is has common value with
cautiousness ci drawn from a probability distribution F with support on the interval (c; c),
with 0  c <  < c < 1.11 As in Gerardi (2000), we assume that F is continuous, strictly
increasing, and admits a density f , such that limx!c f (x) > 0 and limx!c f (x) > 0. Our
denition of asymptotic optimality (Denition 8) still applies.
The main advantage of considering a setup (almost) identical to that of Gerardi (2000)
is that we can use his results about non-unanimous rules in our proof of the following result:
Proposition 4 Proposition 4. For all Q, R; and p; Veto is asymptotically optimal.
Proof. See Online Appendix.
As in the baseline model, Veto gives private-value agents the power to enforce the status
quo without a¤ecting the behavior of common-value agents. The crux of the matter is to
understand why the most cautious common-value agents (i.e., those with a large ci) do
not want to use their veto power.
When other common-value agents play the equilibrium strategy under majority rule,
the expected outcome is R in state !R and Q in state !Q. Therefore, by vetoing the reform,
a common-value agent is more likely to prevent a desirable reform than an undesirable
one. As the size of the group grows larger, the relative likelihood of a mistake tends to
innity, whence no common-value agent wants to veto the reform.
11 In Gerardi (2000), c = 1. In our context, this case is somehow extreme (and unnecessarily complicates
the analysis because of an order-of-limits issue). When c = 1, there may be distribution functions such
that the probability of having an agent who behaves as a private-value agent (because she has very high
cautiouness) tends to 1 when n tends to 1. In these particular cases, Veto and Unanimity would then
both be asymptotically optimal.
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In our setup, we can show that an asymptotically optimal mechanism interim strictly
dominates any mechanism that is not asymptotically optimal. Based on this, we get the
following result:
Proposition 5 Proposition 5. For all Q, R; and p; for n su¢ ciently large, Veto
interim dominates Unanimity.
Proof. See Online Appendix.
5.2. Non-unanimous Decision-making
Our analysis focuses on information aggregation when there is a veto constraint. In many
of the applications we have in mind, this constraint emerges from the need to protect
single individuals (or states). Thus, the veto constraint can be interpreted as an extreme
need for minority protection. But what if the minority in question is larger than 1?
Minority Larger than One. Consider a group of n agents whose objective is to im-
plement the reform if and only if two conditions are satised: (i) it is against the private
interests of no more than f agents, and (ii) the reform is good (from the common-value
agent standpoint). Which voting system should they use?
Veto achieves this objective for f = 0: We conjecture that the following simple rules
would achieve this objective for f > 0 (this is because, similarly to k-Veto, they make
it easier for agents to dissociate the minority protection dimension from the information
aggregation dimension). Under these rules, the action set is the same as under Veto (i.e.,
fr; q; vg), and the aggregation rule is:
df =
8<: R if Xv  f and Xr  n+12Q otherwise,
That is, the reform is adopted if and only if no more than f agents vote v and a majority
vote r. Here, v is a strong action against the reform, but it is no longer a veto.
If these rules indeed show similar properties to Veto, this would provide an argument
for the so-called libuster procedure, which exists in many parliamentary systems, as a
way to balance minority protection and information aggregation.12
12We are very grateful to an anonymous referee for suggesting this extension, and its application to the
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Veto vs. Majority Rules. Now imagine that there is no minority to protect. For
instance, consider a pure common-value set-up (i.e., p = 0). Can we say something of the
comparison of Veto and majority rule? The answer is yes: Veto ex-ante dominates majority
rule (strictly when v is played with positive probability in the Information Aggregation
Equilibrium under Veto).13 To understand why Veto dominates majority rule, rst note
that any strategy prole under majority rule can be reproduced under Veto. Second,
recall from McLennan (1998) that in a pure common-value environment, a strategy prole
producing the maximal ex-ante utility must be an equilibrium. Therefore, there always
exists an equilibrium under Veto that produces an ex-ante utility at least as high as in
the unique equilibrium under majority rule. However, Veto has a larger action set, which
proves useful in cases where the negative signal is precise enough. These are the cases
where Veto strictly dominates majority rule.
6. Empirical Relevance and Applications
In this section, we discuss the empirical relevance of our analysis. First, we argue that in-
ternational organizations often combine an information aggregation problem in a common-
value environment with a veto constraint, and factors that limit timely and truthful com-
munication.14 To argue this point, we discuss the United Nations Security Council. It is
particularly relevant because it suggests that using Veto instead of Unanimity does indeed
improve outcome e¢ ciency. We then extend the argument to international organizations
in general.
Second, we discuss our results in the context of a vast literature that views trials by
jury as an information aggregation problem where the voting system plays a crucial role.
One of the main policy debates focuses on whether to use Unanimity or some form of
majority rule. We argue that our results may bring the two sides of this debate closer
libuster procedure.
13See Proposition 10 in the Online Appendix. This is related to the result of Duggan and Martinelli
(2001) that unanimity rule can dominate non-unanimous rules for some structures of information.
14 In our model, when cis are identical, if pre-vote communication is allowed and costless, there exist
e¢ cient equilibria in which voters truthfully reveal their types in the communication stage and vote for
the optimal group decision in the voting stage (this is a trivial extension of Proposition 8 in Coughlan
(2001), in which we allow agents to communicate their type). In that case, we can simply think of k-





The Charter of the UN is explicit about the common-value dimension: it proclaims that
the peoples of the United Nations resolve to combine their e¤orts to accomplish common
aims (international peace, economic and social advancement of all people, etc.). It grounds
these aims in the ideals of justice and fundamental human rights.
The Charter also states that the Security Council shall make decisions based on an
a¢ rmative vote of nine members which must include the concurring votes of the permanent
members. This, in e¤ect, gives veto power to each permanent member. However, as noted
on the UN website, If a permanent member does not fully agree with a proposed resolution
but does not wish to cast a veto, it may choose to abstain, thus allowing the resolution to
be adopted if it obtains the required number of nine favorable votes.With the exception
that only ve countries have veto power, this corresponds to a k-Veto rule, with an approval
quorum (k) of nine out of fteen members. Indeed, the ten elected members can vote yes,
no, or abstain. The ve permanent members can vote yes, veto, or abstain. In both cases,
abstention counts as a no.
The origin of veto power for the permanent members has been linked to their desire to
protect their sovereignty (see, e.g., Reston 1946; Lee 1947; Posner and Sykes 2014) and to
implementability concerns (see, e.g., Winter 1996). The sovereignty issue is well illustrated
by President Truman in his memoirs. He wrote (Truman 1965, p. 311): In the present
world setup sovereign powers are very jealous of their rights. We had to recognize this as a
condition and to seek united action through compromise.On implementability concerns,
Winter (1996, p. 813) writes: The idea of granting permanent members veto power
evolved directly from the fact that the enforcement of many Security Council resolutions
would require the military and nancial support of the superpowers. Hence, without the
unanimous consent of the permanent members, no e¤ective implementation of Security
Council resolutions could be expected.
Furthermore, major nations made it clear that their participation, and therefore the
existence of the organization itself, was conditional on having veto power: At San Fran-
cisco, the issue was made crystal clear by the leaders of the Big Five: it was either the
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Charter with the veto or no Charter at all(Wilcox 1945, p. 954).
Even if members share common aims, they may still have vested interests and/or
di¤erent views about how to best achieve these aims. In such a context, it seems hardly
plausible that full, truthful, and timely communication is always possible and incentive
compatible. The best way to illustrate this is perhaps with an example. In March 1994, in
the run-up to the Rwandan genocide, a number of key actors were aware of alarming pieces
of intelligence (e.g., the mass training of militias, the establishment of weapon caches, and
the registration of ethnic Tutsis in the capital, Kigali). Subsequent evidence shows that
this intelligence was not shared with the Security Council at the time key decisions were
made.15
The voting rule used by the Security Council has evolved with time, and practice, in
the direction predicted by our results. Article 27(3) of the Charter of the United Nations
makes clear that a voluntary abstention by a permanent member should be treated as a
veto. But this was an early point of contention. Senator Tom Connally (U.S. Delegate
to the General Assembly of November 15, 1946) stated: As it stands today a great
power may nd itself in the utterly ridiculous situation of voting for a measure which it
does not entirely approve or else blocking the wheels of justice by the unwilling use of its
veto. There should be some middle ground if the machinery of peaceful settlement is to
function smoothly (cited in Fassbender 1998, p. 182). Such a middle ground emerged
naturally as a common practice of the Security Council (Liang 1950, Stavropoulos 1967,
and Sievers and Daws 2014). As explained by Stavropoulos (1967, p. 742): It has been
the consistent practice of the Security Council to interpret a voluntary abstention by a
permanent member as not tantamount to a veto.The direct consequence of this practice
is well summarized by Fassbender (1998, pp. 181-182): Voluntary abstention made it
possible for a permanent member to express its reservations about a particular decision
while not obstructing it.16 That such a possibility enhances information aggregation is
15See the report from the National Assembly of France (http://www.assemblee-
nationale.fr/dossiers/rwanda/r1271.asp) and the declassied documents from the National Security
Archive (http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB117/Rw01.pdf).
16The Council of the European Union o¤ers a parallel. Indeed, the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997)
introduced a key novelty for matters of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP): instead of Unanimity,
the voting procedure became unanimity rule under the constructive abstention regime. In that case, if
more than a third of the Member States (or Member States representing more than a third of the EU
population) abstain constructively, the proposal is rejected. This rule formally corresponds to k-Veto,
with a quorum of 2/3 of the votes.
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the key mechanism behind our results.
Permanent members have repeatedly made use of the option to abstain. As a re-
sult, resolutions are frequently adopted without the explicit support of all ve permanent
members.17 The most striking example might be Resolution 344: On 15 December 1973,
Resolution 344 was carried by the votes of the non-permanent members, with all ve
permanent members abstaining(Felsenthal and Machover 2000, p. 11).18
Consistent with our analysis, some observers of the UN seem to agree that interpreting
a voluntary abstention by a permanent member as not tantamount to a veto did improve
decision making in the Security Council. For instance, Liang (1950, p. 707) points out
that [...] had the abstentions been considered as negative votes, the Security Council
would have adopted very few substantive decisions in its more than four yearshistory.
Additionally, Delbruck (1997, p. 302) argues that the UN Security Council interpreted
its voting rules in a way not in conformity with the respective wording of the Charter law,
clearly in line, however, with the purposes and principles of the Charter, since this inter-
pretation enabled the Security Council to act more adequately in the eld of peacekeeping
(cited in Fassbender 1998, p. 182).
As a matter of fact, the early reasons for, and discussion of, abstaining put forth by the
permanent members can be illuminating. For instance, in 1947, the UK Representative
justied his abstention on Resolution 27 as follows: The UK has abstained; but in view
of the fact that everybody here clearly wishes this war to stop, the UK does not wish its
abstention to be treated as a veto invalidating the resolution which has otherwise secured
the necessary majority(cited in Gross 1951, p. 216).
The argument easily generalizes beyond the UN Security Council. First, the principle
of national sovereignty is a pillar of international law. It implies that international orga-
nizations are limited in terms of the measures that they can e¤ectively impose on member
states. In practice, this imposes a constraint on which decision rules that they can use
17As tallied by Felsenthal and Machover (2000, p. 11): In the period 194697, this hap-
pened in the case of 300 resolutions well over 28% of the total 1068 resolutions adopted by the
UNSC. Between 1998 and 2015, we counted 52 additional occurences (voting records are available at
http://www.un.org/en/sc/meetings/).
18Also, as explained by Sievers and Daws (2014, p. 316-317): Although it does not often happen, a
resolution can fail to be adopted, not because of a veto, but because it does not garner su¢ cient a¢ rmative
votes. In contemporary practice, such instances are usually the result of a miscalculation of the voting
intentions of the Council members by the sponsors of a draft resolution [...].
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(see, e.g., Zamora 1980, Sieberson 2010, Tsebelis 2002, and Cogen 2015).19 Accordingly,
Blake and Lockwood Payton (2015) nds that 35% of the 266 intergovernmental organiza-
tions included in their database use unanimous decision making in their supreme decision
making body.
Moreover, the charters of many other international organizations leave no doubt that
the promotion of common values is one of their main raisons dêtre. Koremenos (2013)
studies such reasons empirically and nds the resolution of uncertainty crucial. She states:
Uncertainty about the State of the World is the most common cooperation problem: two-
thirds of the [intergovernmental] agreements attempt to solve it. The pervasiveness of such
uncertainty is not surprising, given the numerous potential domestic and technological
shocks that may a¤ect international cooperation (p. 663). She also nds uncertainty
about the behavior and preferences (of others) to be important.
Finally, there are many factors that hinder informal communication in international
organizations (See Persico 2004). For instance, opportunity cost of time and urgency can
put a limit on the time allocated to information exchange and debate. Information can
also be classied or di¢ cult to interpret by agents with di¤erent technical backgrounds.
Moreover, despite the important common-value dimension, di¤erences of views or vested
interests are likely to restrict truthful communication. This issue is particularly salient
when agents have veto power (Austen-Smith and Feddersen 2006).
6.2. Trials by Jury
There is a vast literature that views trials by jury as an information aggregation problem
where the voting system plays a crucial role. The debate focuses on whether verdicts
should be unanimous. The typical argument for the need of unanimous verdicts is that
It is a widely held belief among legal theorists that the requirement of unanimous jury
verdicts in criminal trials reduces the likelihood of convicting an innocent defendant
(Coughlan 2000, p. 375). After all, according to Neilson and Winter (2005, p. 2) (...)
the prevention of a wrongful conviction is a well-established goal of the legal system.
A rebuttal is put forth by Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998). They show that in a
19For instance, Posner and Sykes (2014) point out that nations are much more likely to be willing
to accept non-unanimous voting systems in organizations whose decisions cannot impose high costs on
its members. However, countries would also benefut from committing to ex-ante benecial agreements,
although they may sometimes wind up on the losing end (See Maggi and Morelli 2006).
26
game-theory setup, non-unanimous verdicts protect the innocent better. This argument,
which has triggered reactions and challenges (see, e.g., Gerardi 2000, Coughlan 2001,
Duggan and Martinelli 2001, Persico 2004, and Austen-Smith and Feddersen 2006), has
not been used successfully by proponents of non-unanimous verdicts.20 Our results suggest
a new angle in this debate because k-Veto rules combine the strengths of both Unanimity
and majority rules: they foster information aggregation while still granting every juror
the power to prevent a conviction.
7. Conclusion
In our view, in addition to their strong theoretical properties, the simplicity of k-Veto
rules makes them particularly appealing for real-world applications. As we have discussed,
there are voting bodies that use this voting system or slight variations thereof. Still, many
voting bodies use Unanimity or Consensus, including international organizations such as
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Council of the European Union on most
sensitive topics (excluding the Common Foreign and Security Policy), and the Southern
Common Market (Mercosur). Our results suggest that (i) they should consider using a
k-Veto rule instead; (ii) such an institutional reform should not encounter much resistance.
Any call for reform should, however, be supported by strong empirical evidence. Our
companion paper, Bouton et al. (2016), is a rst step in that direction. We compare Veto
and Unanimity through a series of controlled laboratory experiments. By and large, we
nd strong support for the dominance of Veto over Unanimity.
20Advocates of non-unanimous verdicts may also contend that (...) non-unanimous verdict protects
the jury from the obstinacy of the erratic or otherwise unreasonable holdout juror, decreases the likelihood
of a hung jury, and reduces the costs associated with re-trying a case when the jury fails to reach a verdict
Diamond Rose and Murphy (2005, p.4).
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Appendices
Appendix A1: Equilibrium Analysis under Veto
Proposition 1 greatly simplies the characterization of any equilibrium under Veto since it allows
us to focus on the pure common-value game in which p = 0.
We organize the equilibrium analysis as follows: rst, we dene the pivotal events, compute
their probabilities, and derive the possible actionsexpected payo¤s. Second, we characterize the
set of equilibria. Finally, we argue that only one equilibrium is relevant.
In the common-value game, there are n common-value agents, i.e. i 2 fQ; Rg 8i. We will
often refer to Q and R as signals instead of types.
Agents behavior depend on pivotal events: situations in which their vote changes the nal
outcome towards a specic group decision. In other words, an agent is pivotal if the group decision
would be di¤erent without her vote. Whether a vote is pivotal therefore depends on the decision
rule and on all other agentsbehavior. Agentsbehavior, in turn, depends on their strategies and
on the signal they receive. Thus, for any strategy prole, it is possible to compute the probability
of each pivotal event.
At this point, it is useful to introduce two new objects. First, xa denotes, from the perspective
of a given agent, the number of other agents playing action a: Second, !a () denotes the state-






where Pr (Rj!) = Pr (sRj!) and Pr (Qj!) = Pr (sQj!) 8! since p = 0:
Pivot Probabilities and Payo¤s
Under Veto, there are two pivotal events. First, a r-vote is pivotal when, without that vote, R is
lacking just one vote to be adopted (i.e. xr = n 12 ) and nobody cast a v-vote. We denote that
pivotal event in state ! by piv!R: Second, a v-vote is pivotal when the number of r-votes among
other agents is larger or equal to the quorum n+12 (i.e. xr  n+12 ) and nobody else casts a v-vote.
We denote that pivotal event in state ! by piv!Q: Importantly, a q-ballot is never pivotal under
Veto. Indeed, this would require that, without that vote, R wins (i.e. xr  n+12 ), and, with that
vote, Q wins (i.e. Xr < n+12 ); an impossibility.
For the sake of readability, our notation does not reect the fact that the probability of pivotal
events depend on the strategies through the expected vote shares, i.e. we henceforth omit  from
the notation.
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Using these pivot probabilities, we can compute the expected payo¤ of the di¤erent actions
for a common-value agent of type  2 fQ; Rg. To do this, it is useful to dene common-value
agentsinterim beliefs about the state of nature:
Pr(!Qj) = Pr(j!Q)
Pr(j!Q) + Pr(j!R) ; and
Pr(!Rj) = Pr(j!R)
Pr(j!R) + Pr(j!Q) :
Therefore, we have that the expected payo¤ of an r-vote for a common-value agent who received
signal  is
G(rj) = Pr (!Rj) Pr(piv!RR )  Pr (!Qj) Pr(piv!QR ); (3)
the expected payo¤ of a v-vote for a common-value agent who received signal  is
G(vj) = Pr (!Qj) Pr(piv!QQ )  Pr (!Rj) Pr(piv!RQ ); (4)
and the expected payo¤ of a q-vote for a common-value agent who received signal  is
G(qj) = 0: (5)
The Information-Aggregation Equilibrium
To organize the discussion of the equilibrium behavior of common-value agents under Veto, it is
useful to partition the parameter space. This is because equilibrium strategies are non-trivially
a¤ected by the relative precision of the signals. We denote the precision of a signal Q by Q 
Pr(Qj!Q)
Pr(Qj!R) 2 (1;1) and that of signal R by R 
Pr(Rj!R)
Pr(Rj!Q) 2 (1;1).21 For any n and R, we
have identied four thresholds 1; 2; 3; 4 for Q; at which the set of actions played with strictly
positive probability in equilibrium changes. Next proposition characterizes these thresholds and
the equilibrium associated with it.
Proposition 6 Proposition 6 (Information-Aggregation Equilibrium). For each tuple







; there exist unique thresholds 1; 2; 3; 4 (with 1 < 1 < 2  3  4 < 1)
such that the following strategy prole is a responsive symmetric equilibrium under Veto:
r (R) = 1      q (R) =  +  v (R) = 0
r (Q) = 
 q (Q) = 1      v (Q) = 
where , ,  and,  are unique; and satisfy the following properties
Q < 1 Q 2 [1; 2] Q 2 (2; 3] Q 2 (3; 4) Q  4
 [0; 1) 0 0 0 0
 0 0 (0; 1) 0 0
 0 0 0 (0; 1  ) 0
 0 0 0 (0; 1) 1
Proof. See Online Appendix.




for n = 7. In short, the voting behavior
under Veto is as follows. For Q 2 [1; 3]; the behavior of common-value agents under Veto is the
same as it would be under majority rule, and for Q 2 [4;1) it is the same as it would be under
Unanimity. For Q 2 (3; 4) ; all actions are played with positive probability. Therefore, the
behavior under Veto is necessarily di¤erent than under majority rule or Unanimity. We now detail
the mechanisms behind the behavior of common-value agents for the di¤erent values of Q.
[Insert Figure 1 around here]
When Q 2 [1; 2] ; the precision of the two signals is not too di¤erent. The equilibrium
is then such that r (R) = 1 = q (Q): common-value agents vote their signal and do not use
their veto. The intuition is the following. An r-ballot is pivotal if there are n 12 votes for R in
the group of other agents. Given the strategy under consideration, this requires that in the group
of other agents, there are n 12 signals Q and
n 1
2 signals R. Adding ones own signal to this
count means a lead of one signal in favor of one of the two states. The condition Q 2 [1; 2]
ensures that, in such a case, the posterior beliefs of the agent under consideration are in line with
her signal. In other words, conditional on an r-ballot being pivotal, R-agents believe that R is
best and Q-agents believe that Q is best. The implication in terms of voting behavior is obvious
for R-agents: they vote for r. For Q-agents, the situation is slightly more complicated since
there are two options to vote against R: voting either q or v. A q-ballot has an expected payo¤
of zero, whereas a v-ballot has a negative expected payo¤. This is so because a v-ballot changes
the outcome when there are n+12 or more r votes. Given the strategy under consideration and the
relative precision of the signals, this is more likely to happen in state !R than in state !Q:
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When Q 2 [1; 1) ; signal R is more precise than signal Q: In that case, Q-agents prefer to
overlook their signal and vote r with positive probability. Doing so, they compensatefor the bias
in the information structure. The reason is that, because the signal is imprecise, the probability
of making a mistake in state !R is too high. This is exactly the same behavior as under majority
rule.
The case with Q 2 (2; 3] resembles the one with Q 2 [1; 1), but the di¤erence in signal
precision is in favor of Q: As a result of the di¤erence in signal precision, R-agents prefer to
overlook their signal and vote against R with positive probability. Again, this is similar as under
majority rule. Yet, under Veto agents have two ways to vote against R: voting q or v: The appeal
of v depends positively on the precision of the Q signal, and negatively on the relative probability
of being pivotal in favor of Q in states !R and !Q: Therefore, 3 requires that, for a given precision
of the Q signal, the expected lead of R in state !R is large enough and/or the lead of Q in state
!Q small enough.
When Q 2 (3; 4) ; the situation resembles the situation for Q 2 (2; 3] : The di¤erence
is that Q-agents want to use their veto power with positive probability. As just explained, this
is so because, for the strategy prole when Q 2 (2; 3], the expected lead of R in state !R is
too large in comparison to the expected lead of Q in state !Q. In equilibrium, (1) R-agents mix
between r and q; but they vote r with higher probability than for Q  3, and (2) Q-agents mix
between q and v. The intuition comes in two steps. First, the positive probability of a veto by




R ) goes up since there are more
Q-agents in state !Q). Second, the relatively higher vote shares of R in state !R makes a v-vote
less appealing (i.e. Pr(piv!RQ ) goes up and Pr(piv
!Q
Q ) goes down).
When Q 2 [4;1), common-value agents behave as they would under Unanimity. The Q
signal is so precise (relatively) that one Q signal is su¢ cient information to conclude that Q is
better than R (even if all other signals are R signals). Therefore, Q-agents prefer to cast a v-vote.
For R-agents, the situation is di¤erent. Given the strategy under consideration, conditional on
being pivotal, all other agents must have received a R-signal. Obviously, if there are only R
signals, any agent must believe that state !R is more likely than state !Q: She thus prefers to cast
a r-vote.
The Unanimity-like Equilibrium
We show here that, when Q < 4, there exists another symmetric responsive equilibrium which
corresponds to the unique equilibrium under Unanimity (in the next subsection, we show that
this is the only other equilibrium). However, such an equilibrium is not robust under Veto (see
discussion below). We therefore see it as of little relevance.
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Proposition 7 Proposition 7 (Unanimity-Like Equilibrium). If Q < 4, the following
strategy prole is a responsive symmetric equilibrium under Veto:
r (R) = 1 q (R) = 0 v (R) = 0
r (Q) = 













 2 [0; 1).
This equilibrium corresponds to the unique equilibrium under Unanimity.
Proof. Straightforward extension of Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998). See Appendix A2 for
detail.
Under Unanimity, Q-agents realize they can only be pivotal if all other agents vote r. Given
that this is more likely to happen in state !R (because R-agents always play r), Q-agents only
play v with probability 1 if signal sQ is su¢ ciently precise (Q  4). In all other cases, they play
r with positive probability, which results in a relatively high probability of errors of both types
(Feddersen and Pesendorfer 1998).
To understand why it is also an equilibrium under Veto, remember that we can redene Una-
nimity using the same decision rule as under Veto. Then, Unanimity corresponds to Veto with a
smaller action set. That is, action q is not available under Unanimity. Under Veto, when no other
agent ever votes q, a q-vote is strategically equivalent to an r-vote (since the approval quorum
is satised with probability 1, the reform will be adopted unless someone vetoes it).22 So, the
equilibrium under Unanimity must be an equilibrium under Veto.
However, we see several reasons to question the robustness of such an equilibrium under Veto.
First, as we show in the welfare analysis, it is Pareto Dominated by the information-aggregation
equilibrium.
Second, it is instable in the following sense. Imagine that Q-agents tremble and play q with
very small but strictly positive probability  (in equilibrium, they are indi¤erent between the three
possible actions), while R-agents still play r with probability 1. Then, a best response for Q-
agents cannot involve playing both r and v with strictly positive probability, i.e. it cannot be
close to the equilibrium strategy prole. In fact, as  tends to 0, the equilibrium of such a
perturbed game tends to the information-aggregation equilibrium. The intuition is the following:
in the unanimity-like equilibrium, agents are indi¤erent between q and r because one can never be
pivotal in favor of R (if no other agent has vetoed, then it must be that everyone else played r, and
there already is a majority in favor of the reform). But, if q is played with positive probability,
even very small, it becomes possible that xr = n 12 . Since this is more likely to happen in state Q
22 In terms of information aggregation, playing q at such an equilibrium could convey information, but
such information would not be exploited in taking the group decision.
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than in state R, a Q-agent then strictly prefers to vote q than r. Note that if Q-agents do not
play r, this decreases the gain for them to play v, and the equilibrium unravels.23
Finally, we present in a companion paper the results of an experimental study that strongly
supports the prediction that agents will coordinate on the information-aggregation equilibrium
rather than the unanimity-like equilibrium (see Bouton et al. 2016).
No Other Equilibria
We show that there cannot be other responsive symmetric equilibria than those described in Propo-
sitions 6 and 7. The proof is rather straightforward, but quite tedious, so we organize it with the
matrix in Figure 2 that considers all the possible classes of (symmetric) strategy proles. Possible
classes of strategy for an agent are given by: fr; rq; q; qv; v; qrv; rvg, where for instance rq means
that this agent plays r and q (but not v) with strictly positive probability.
[Insert Figure 2 around here]
We show in ve steps that the only possible equilibria correspond to the information-aggregation
equilibrium (cells IAE) and the unanimity-like one (cells ULE).
First, note that if agent Q play r with positive probability at equilibrium, it must be the case
that agent R plays r with probability 1. This is just because signals are informative. Formally,
from equations (3), (4), and (5), we have:
G(rjQ)  0) G(rjR) > 0;
and
G(rjQ)  G(vjQ)) G(rjR) > G(vjR):
Similarly, if agent R plays v with positive probability, then agent Q plays v with probability 1.
These two restrictions rule out the cases corresponding to the shaded cells with reference "x".
Second, we can rule out a series of remaining cases where the strategy prole is not responsive.
These are the cells in dark grey.
Third, from the characterization of the information-aggregation equilibrium, we have that: (i)
if agents Q play v with probability 1, then agents R can only be pivotal if all agents receive a
signal R. In which case they strictly prefer to play r. We can therefore rule out another set of
proles. The corresponding cells are shaded and labelled Prop 6.
Fourth, from equation (5); it is easy to show that, if agents Q play qv or qrv, then R-agents
play r with probability 1 only if Q  2: But then, we have that G (vjQ) < 0; a contradiction.
23The equilibrium is, however, trembling-hand perfect because it is possible to nd a joint sequence of
tremble for all agents that tends to 0, and a corresponding sequence of equilibria that converges towards
the equilibrium. However, it is easy to show that such sequences must have the unappealing feature that
trembles make agents R are more likely to vote for q than agents Q.
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We can therefore rule out these proles as well. The corresponding cells are shaded and labelled
no veto.
Finally, the remaining cells correspond to the two equilibria we have characterized. And we
have shown that they are both unique within their strategy prole class.
Appendix A2: Equilibrium Analysis under Unanimity
In this appendix, we characterize the unique responsive equilibrium under Unanimity. Doing so, we
extend the equilibrium characterization in Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998) to biased information
structure and the possible presence of a private-value agent.
As under Veto, P -agents strictly prefers to play v, i.e. Uv (P ) = 1; in any responsive sym-
metric equilibrium under Unanimity. It is therefore straightforward to extend Proposition 1.
Proposition 8 Proposition 8. Under Unanimity, for any vector p;  is an equilibrium under
Unanimity if and only if:
i) private-value agents veto the reform;
ii)  is an equilibrium of the corresponding game with p = 0:
Proof. Identical to that of Proposition 1.
As for Veto, this Proposition greatly simplies the equilibrium analyzing by allowing us to focus
on the pure common-value game in which p = 0: This is exactly what we do in the remainder of
this Appendix.
Pivot Probabilities and Expected Payo¤s
Under Unanimity, a vote for r is pivotal if and only if, without that vote, the group decision is
Q but, with that vote, it becomes R. This happens when no other agent is casting a v-vote (i.e.
xv = 0). In this case, we say that the vote is pivotal in favor of R: We denote this event in state !
by piv!;UR : The probability of that event depends on expected vote shares, which in turn depends
on the state of the world and agent strategies. We denote Pr(piv!;UR ) the probability to be pivotal
in favor of R in state ! under Unanimity. Formally:




A vote for v cannot be pivotal. Indeed, there is no combination of other agentsvote such that
the decision is R without this vote and becomes Q with it. In fact, either xv > 0 and the current
outcome, Q, can no longer be changed, or xv = 0, which implies xr = n 1 < n, and the current
outcome is Q. Remember that q is not an available action under U .
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The expected payo¤ of actions r for an agent of type  2 fR; Qg under Unanimity is
GU (rj) = Pr(!Rj) Pr(piv!R;UR )  Pr(!Qj) Pr(piv!Q;UR ); (7)
and the expected payo¤ of actions v for an agent with signal  2 fR; Qg under Unanimity is
GU (vj) = 0: (8)
The Unique Equilibrium
The following proposition extends the equilibrium characterization in Feddersen and Pesendorfer
(1998) to possibly biased information structures and the possible presence of private-value agents.
Proposition 9 Proposition 9. The following strategy prole is the unique responsive symmetric
equilibrium under Unanimity:
(i) if Q < 4; then
Ur (R) = 1;
Ur (Q) = 













 2 (0; 1).
(ii) if Q  4, then
Ur (R) = 1, and 
U
v (Q) = 1:
Proof. See Online Appendix.
The intuition is easier to grasp by rst explaining why and when R-agents voting r and Q-
agents voting v is not an equilibrium (i.e. Q < 4). Consider an agent who receives signal Q.
She believes, but is not sure, that Q is a better decision than R. When deciding which vote to cast,
she only focuses on situations in which her vote is pivotal. Under Unanimity, this only happens
when all other agents vote for r (event piv!;UR ). If R-agents vote r and Q-agents vote v, this
happens if all other agents have received a signal R, which is more likely to happen in state !R
than in state !Q: As long as the precision of the Q signal is not too high (i.e. Q < 4), the joint
event (n   1 R-signals and 1 Q-signal) is also more likely in state !R than in state !Q. She is
thus better overlooking her signal and voting for r. Therefore, R-agents voting r and Q-agents
voting v cannot be an equilibrium in this case.
To understand why the equilibrium is in mixed strategies when Q < 4, notice that when
Q-agents mix between r and v; the information content conditional on being pivotal decreases
(since Q-agents also vote r with positive probability, the fact of being pivotal no longer hinges
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on all other agents having received R-signals; hence, the posterior probability of being in state
!R when being pivotal decreases). For Ur (Q) large enough, this information content is too low
to convince Q-agents to overlook their signal. The equilibrium corresponds to the case where the
posterior probability of being in either state is equal, which makes agents indi¤erent between the
two actions.
For Q  4, the precision of the Q-signal is so high that a Q-agent remains convinced that
state !Q is more likely when all other agents received a R-signal. In other words, a single Q-signal
would su¢ ce to convince an agent that could observe the n signals and could decide for the group
to choose decision Q. Therefore, R-agents voting r and Q-agents voting v is an equilibrium. Note
that there always is an n su¢ ciently large such that this case does not arise.
Appendix A3: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. Given Proposition 1, we can focus on p = 0:
First, note that v is a weakly dominant strategy for Q-agents when Q > (R)
n 1
: The proof
that R-agents play r under k-Veto is similar to step (v) of Proposition 6 (the Proposition is in
Appendix A1 and the proof in the Online Appendix).




, R-agents playing r and Q-agents playing




n k ): To do so, we rst need to dene the gains to





















































(Pr (Rj!R))j (Pr (Qj!R))n 1 j :
For r (R) = 1, and q (Q) = 1 to be an equilibrium, we need (a)Gk(rjR)  0; (b)Gk(rjQ) 
0, (c) Gk(vjQ)  0; and (d) Gk(rjR)  Gk(vjR). From Gk(vjQ)  Gk(vjR) and (a) and (c),
we have that (d) is necessarily satised. It remains to prove that conditions (a), (b), and (c) are
satised.









which is satised i¤ Q  (R)
k
n k , which holds by assumption.
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which is satised i¤ (R)
k 1
n+1 k  Q, which holds by assumption.
Consider condition (d). Following an identical approach as in the proof of Proposition 6 (for




From Q  (R)
k
n k ; R > 1; and
j
n j  kn k 8j 2 fk; :::; n  1g; we have that this is satised.
Proof of Theorem 1. To prove the theorem, we show that all agents are weakly better o¤
under Veto at the information-aggregation equilibrium (we denote the corresponding mechanism
by VIA) than at the unique equilibrium under Unanimity (UU ) and that, unless i = P or
Q  4, some agents are strictly better o¤.
First, VIA() = UU () = Q when 9i s.t. i = P or Q  4. In these cases, all agents are
equally well o¤ ex post and, therefore, at the interim stage.
Now consider i 6= P 8i and Q < 4. The game is equivalent to the pure common-value
game (i.e. p = 0). We show that
ui(VIA ji) > ui(UU ji) (9)
holds for all R; Q; and n, and for all possible realizations of , at least weakly for Q-agents,
and striclty for R-agents.
Step 1: Q-agents
Under Unanimity, the strategy of a Q-agent is Ur (Q) = 
, and Uv (Q) = 1    (Propo-
sition 9 in Appendix A2). As she is indi¤erent between playing r and v, her interim utility is the
same in both cases. If she plays v, then the decision is Q for sure, and her expected utility is minus




Under Veto, at the information aggregation equilibrium (Proposition 6 in Appendix A1), Q-
agents either choose not to veto, or they are indi¤erent between vetoing and voting q. They cannot
be strictly worse o¤ under VIA than UU by a simple revealed preference argument: these agents
could always ensure a level of expected utility equal to  11+Q by vetoing. Note that we can in fact
show that they are strictly better o¤ under VIA than UU when they choose not to (but this is
not needed for Theorem 1).
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Step 2: R-agents when Q 2 [1; 2]:













R Pr(xr  n 12 j!R; IA)  Pr(xr  n 12 j!Q; IA)
1 + R
: (11)
For condition (9) to hold strictly, we need:
R Pr(xr  n 12 j!R; IA)  Pr(xr  n 12 j!Q; IA) >
R Pr(xr = n  1j!R; U )  Pr(xr = n  1j!Q; U ):

























j+1    Qn 1 ji :















j+1    Qn 1 ji :





















j+1    Qn 1 ji (12)
We can now compare these two sums term by term (recall that here Q 2 [1; 2]) and show
that the LHS terms are always larger that the RHS terms. First, observe that the terms in




j+1   Qn 1 j ;with strict inequality for j > n 12 . Since  < 1; the LHS terms
are strictly higher than the RHS terms 8 j 2 [n 12 ; n   1): Third, for j < n 12 ; note that from
Q  1  (R)
n 1
n+1 , we have that (R)
j+1   Qn 1 j ;with strict inequality for j < n 32 . So,
all the respective terms on the RHS are negative and they are equal to 0 in the LHS.
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Step 3: R-agents when Q 2 (2; 3]:
In this case, under UU , R-agents still always play r. Hence, their interim utility is still given
by (10) : But we have IAr (R) = 1  " and IAq (R) = " (Proposition 6). Since they mix, their





R Pr(xr  n+12 j!R; IA)  Pr(xr  n+12 j!Q; IA)
1 + R
This can be rewritten as follows:













"R(Q   1) + (R   1)
n 1 j
   "(Q   1) + Q(R   1)n 1 j
#
By the denition of ", it is easy to show that the term in j = n 12 is nil (it exactly corresponds to
the agents gain of playing r, which is nil in this equilibrium) and that the terms in j < n 12 are
strictly negative. Therefore, we have that:













"R(Q   1) + (R   1)
n 1 j
   "(Q   1) + Q(R   1)n 1 j
#
Using the Binomial Theorem this corresponds to:






R(Q   1) + (R   1)
n 1   (Q   1) + Q(R   1)n 1
Now, from Proposition 9, we have:






R(Q   1) + (R   1)
n 1    (Q   1) + Q(R   1)n 1
Thus, for ui(VIA jR) > ui(UU jR) to hold, it is su¢ cient that:
R

R(Q   1) + (R   1)
n 1   (Q   1) + Q(R   1)n 1
 R

R(Q   1) + (R   1)
n 1    (Q   1) + Q(R   1)n 1 :
To prove that this is always satised, we show that the derivative of the RHS with respect to 
is positive:




R(Q   1) + (R   1)
n 2   Q  (Q   1) + Q(R   1)n 2i > 0:
To see this, we use that GU (vjQ) = 0 in equilibrium requires (see the proof of Proposition 6 in
the Online Appendix):
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which is always strictly satised when Q < 4:
Step 4: R-agents when Q 2 (3; 4).
To show that VIA ex-ante strictly dominates UU , we construct a (non-equilibrium) strategy
prole 0 such that V0 ex-ante dominates VU . That is:
ui(V0) > ui(VU ):
By McLennan, 1998, which shows that the strategy that maximizes ex-ante welfare in a common-
value game must be an equilibrium, we know that there must be another equilibrium under Veto
that ex ante strictly dominates U : Since there are only two equilibria under Veto, this dominating
equilibrium must be IA: Since VU is equivalent to UU ; i.e. VU () = UU () for all ; we have
that
ui(VIA) > ui(UU ):
Dene 0 as follows:
0r(R) = 1; 
0
q(R) = 
; 0v(R) = 1  ;
where  correspond to that of Proposition 7.



























j+1    Qn 1 ji :















j+1    Qn 1 ji :
And it is obvious that the condition holds strictly since we have that (R)
j+1   Qn 1 jfor all
j  n 32 since Q  3  (R)
n+1
n 1 (See the proof for Proposition 6).




























j    Qn ji :















j    Qn ji :
And it is obvious that the condition holds since we have that: (R)
j   Qn jfor all j  n 12
since Q  3  (R)
n+1
n 1 .
Hence, ui(V0) > ui(VU ), which is what we need.
Step 5: R-agents when Q 2 (1; 1):
First we use  and  (from Propositions 6 and 9) to derive the probabilities that the reform
is adopted (conditional on the agent being R) in each state under both rules (remember that
AIr (R) = 1 = 
U
r (R) in the case under consideration).

V (!R)  Pr(VAI () = Rj!R) = Pr(xr 
n  1
2













j n+1n 1  Q   1j  Q n+1n 1   1n 1 j ;

V (!Q)  Pr(VAI () = Rj!Q) = Pr(xr 
n  1
2







































Note that they are all independent from R:
The interim utility of a R-agent is given by (10) and (11)under UU and VIA , respectively.












From step 2, we know that ui(VIA jR) > ui(UU jR) when Q = 1. To prove that this
inequality holds for any Q 2 (1; R) ; it is su¢ cient to prove that it is satised for any R larger
than the R such that Q = 1: Given that 

	 (!) is independent of R for all 	 and !; a su¢ cient
condition for ui(VIA jR) > ui(UU jR) to be satised for larger R is that 
V (!R)  
U (!R).







































n 1 + 1)n 1(Q   1)n 1






















































Given that the terms in j = n  1 = k cancel out, we can focus on j < n  1 and k < n  1. Note
















 1 + n 1 jn 1
2
(Indeed, for x   1 and r 2 Rn (0; 1) ; we know that (1 + x)r  1 + rx is satised). Thus, it is









































Let us compare the terms two-by-two in the following order: j = n 12 with k =
n 3
2 ; j =
n+1
2
with k = n 52 ; j =
n+3
2 with k =
n 7







(n 1 j)!j!  (n 1)!(j+1)!(n 1 j 1)! :
Simple algebra gives j  n 12   1, which is satised since we consider all j 2 fn 12 ; n+12 ; :::; n  2g.









n 1   x 1n 1

:
Proof. See Online Appendix.
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FIGURES
Caption Figure 1: Equilibrium strategies under Veto for n = 7. The letters in parentheses
refer to the strategy of the common-value agents. The rst element of each couple refers to the
strategy of Q-agents. The second element of each couple refers to the strategy of R-agents. Pure
strategies are denoted by single letters, mixed strategies are denoted by couple of letters.
Caption Figure 2: All possible classes of (symmetric) strategy proles. For instance, strategy
rq for agents of type z means that they play r and q (but not v) with strictly positive probability.
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